

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08 :
CIA-RDP81-00280R000200020052-7

50X1-HUM

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08 :
CIA-RDP81-00280R000200020052-7

SEE BOTTOM OF PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL SPECIAL CONTROLS, IF ANY

S-E-C-R-E-T

INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

PREPARED AND DISSEMINATED BY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

COUNTRY

USSR

SUBJECT

Possible Reasons for the Change in the "Slava"
Whaling Expedition Travel Route

DATE DISTRIBUTED

50X1-HUM

29 Oct 1956

NO. OF PAGES

NO. OF ENCLS.

2

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT #

IVE TO

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

1. It may be worth noting that the "Slava" Whaling Expedition led by Flotilla Commander (kapitan direktor) Solovnik, has been travelling an altered route during the past two or three years.
2. From the time this expedition was first organized, it followed one and the same established route: Odessa-Bosporus-Dardanelles-Gibraltar-Antarctic (expedition grounds). Travelling this route, the expedition covered 10,000 miles, that is, from Odessa to the Antarctic, stopping at Capetown on the way (10,000 miles to the Eastern part of the Weddell Sea).
3. At present, the expedition travels to the Antarctic on an altered route, ie, Odessa-Bosporus-Dardanelles-Gibraltar-Montevideo (calling at this port)-Antarctic (hunting grounds). Following the altered route, the expedition now covers 11,400 miles on its run from Odessa to the Antarctic, with one call at Montevideo, (11,400 miles to the Eastern part of the Weddell Sea), that is almost 1400 sea miles more than the distance covered previously.
4. [] the change of the expedition's travel route was not just an accidental matter. Most probably the Soviet government uses the expedition in order to pursue its own plans in the South American countries. It certainly attempts to promote contact with agents and pro-Communist elements and coordinate propaganda and subversive activities. [] the Soviet government wants to use the South American countries as a bridgehead for an attack against the US and the "Slava" Whaling Expedition is just one of a series of vehicles serving this end. Surely the Soviet government would not allow the expedition commander to exceed his travel limits by almost 1,400 miles if it did not have ulterior motives. The number of personnel accompanying the "Slava" expedition is very large. The whaling factory ship has a displacement of about 30,000 tons and is usually accompanied by 12-15 whale-boats and other expedition vessels. The total crew of the expedition amounts to at least 500-600 persons. For such a large expedition, 1,400 miles of unnecessary travel, equivalent to six or eight days, demands considerable fuel consumption and a lot of extra supplies for the crew (coming to at least 10,000 rubles for six or eight days). Those are very high operational expenses.

50X1-HUM

50X1-HUM

S-E-C-R-E-T

DISTRIBUTION

STATE

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FOR

EV ORR

5. Here are the distances travelled by the "Slava" Whaling Expedition:

- (a) Previous route: Odessa-Gibraltar - 2,155 miles
 Gibraltar-Capetown - 5,100 miles
 Capetown-Weddell Sea area - 2,700 miles.
- (b) Present route: Odessa-Gibraltar - 2,155 miles,
 Gibraltar-Montevideo - 5,200 miles
 Montevideo-Weddell Sea area - 4,000 miles.

50X1-HUM

6. Soviet Merchant Marine vessels make frequent trips to South American ports, sometimes even passing through the Panama Canal. For instance, a late-model Soviet tanker, the "Ashkhabad" (at least 10,000 tons) called at some South American port in December 1955. [redacted] The tanker "Volga Don", commanded by Captain Fomenko, visited some South American port in January 1956. Also in January 1956, the large dry-cargo motor ship "Admiral Ushakov", commanded by Captain Kruk, called at one of the South-American ports. It should be noted that trips by Soviet vessels to South American ports are neither on an infrequent nor casual basis. When looking at Soviet publications for 1955 and 1956 (particularly "Vodny Transport"), one may see that such trips occur frequently and fairly regularly as well. It may be worth noting also that vessels belonging to a few South American countries and Mexico also ply between home ports and ports of the Soviet Union. [redacted] practically every Soviet vessel leaving its home port on a distant voyage (calling at foreign ports) in some way or another serves Soviet propaganda purposes or serves as a connecting link for other Soviet government subversive activities.

50X1-HUM

7. [redacted] unable to state categorically that Montevideo happens to be the central station through which Soviet vessels provide pro-Communist elements in Uruguay and other South American countries with the necessary materials. It is possible, however, that Montevideo harbor is actually one of such central points because Soviet vessels visit Montevideo more frequently than any other South American ports. Also, the government of the Republic of Uruguay maintains diplomatic relations with the USSR.

50X1-HUM

8. [redacted] the USSR government attaches great importance to all South American countries and considers them a bridgehead for operations directed against the US and that penetration into South American countries is a far-reaching problem for the USSR government. [redacted]

In a tactical sense, the USSR government rates Soviet merchant vessels very highly as an instrument for penetration into South American countries.

9. [redacted] all Embassies and Soviet Government agencies overseas organize or control espionage activities.

50X1-HUM

10. [redacted]
11. Propaganda material is not only delivered to foreign ports by means of non-Soviet vessels but Soviet vessels as well. Methods of delivery can be quite varied, that is legal and illegal. One of the legal means of delivery of such material is via special agencies, (for instance "Mezhdunarodnaya kniga" and others of this type). One of the illegal methods of delivery of this material is to ship them dressed up as freight or assigned to some dummy consignee living in one country or another.
12. If propaganda material is shipped on vessels as freight or dressed up as freight, customs inspection cannot interfere with its packing. Type and amount of freight is checked by means of ships' cargo documents without opening crates or packing. Various descriptions regarding the cargo and its destination can be entered in the shipping documents.

13. [redacted]
14. [redacted] the Soviet government lends active support to subversive groups in South American countries. This support is confined not only to material assistance but also extends to guidance, instruction and moral assistance.

-end -

S-E-C-R-E-T